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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 14-3464 
_______________ 
 
PAULA CRUZ DE ORTIZ, 
                 Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
          Respondent 
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA–1 A044-927-258) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 21, 2015 
 
BEFORE: FISHER, CHAGARES AND COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 11, 2015) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
______________  
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Paula Cruz de Ortiz petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”), which, in turn, dismissed her administrative appeal from the decision of 
the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) pretermitting her application for cancellation of removal, 
denying her request for a continuance, and ordering her removal.  We will deny her 
petition for review. 
I. 
 In 1989, Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, attempted to 
enter the United States with an altered passport.  Petitioner was convicted of forgery or 
false use of a passport in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1543 and deported.  Subsequently, her 
husband (a United States citizen) filed an I-130 petition for alien relative, which was 
approved.  A visa was issued for Petitioner by the American embassy, and she was 
admitted to the United States as a conditional lawful permanent resident on February 9, 
1995.  However, neither Petitioner nor her husband disclosed the existence of Petitioner’s 
prior conviction.  On December 24, 1996, Petitioner filed an I-751 petition to remove the 
conditions of her residency.  This I-751 petition was approved on December 30, 1996. 
 On June 27, 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) charged that 
Petitioner was removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) as an alien who was 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and 
who was inadmissible at the time of entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).  Petitioner moved to terminate the removal proceedings on the 
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ground that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a), DHS had no legal authority to initiate removal 
proceedings more than five years from the date of her purported adjustment of status.  
The IJ agreed with the Petitioner and dismissed the case.  In a published decision, In re 
Cruz de Ortiz, 25 I. & N. Dec. 601 (BIA Sept. 20, 2011), the BIA sustained DHS’s appeal 
and remanded the case to give Petitioner an opportunity to apply for any relief for which 
she may be eligible (and to allow the IJ to enter a new decision).  On remand, the IJ 
pretermitted Petitioner’s application for cancellation and ordered her to be removed.  The 
IJ also denied her motion to postpone because no I-130 petition (which could lead to an 
inadmissibility waiver) had been filed on Petitioner’s behalf.  Petitioner appealed to the 
BIA, but the BIA dismissed her appeal.1 
II. 
 The BIA recognized that this Court has held that the five-year statute of limitations 
established by § 1256(a) extends to removal proceedings where the grounds of 
removability are based on the alien’s fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining adjustment 
of status.2  See Garcia v. Attorney General, 553 F.3d 724, 725-29 (3d Cir. 2009); 
Bamidele v. INS, 99 F.3d 557, 558-65 (3d Cir. 1996).  However, the agency determined 
                                                 
 1 Petitioner filed a motion to reopen proceedings, which included proof that her 
United States citizen daughter submitted an I-130 petition on her behalf (after the IJ’s 
decision was issued).  The IJ denied the motion on jurisdictional grounds (i.e., by the time 
the motion was filed, there was an appeal pending with the BIA), and Petitioner did not 
appeal to the BIA from this denial of her motion to reopen.  According to Petitioner, the 
daughter’s petition has been approved. 
 
 2 We generally possess jurisdiction over this petition for review pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1252. 
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that this provision does not apply to an alien “who was admitted as a lawful permanent 
resident from abroad and whose status was therefore never adjusted.”  De Ortiz, 25 I. & 
N. Dec. at 604.  According to Petitioner, “the BIA erred in failing to sua sponte terminate 
proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a), which Petitioner submits, barred the 
institution of removal proceedings against her, as she adjusted her status, from conditional 
to permanent resident, within the United States.”  (Petitioner’s Brief at 7.)  We agree with 
the Attorney General that the removal of conditions to lawful permanent residency does 
not fall under § 1256(a).  Specifically, Petitioner did not file an application for adjustment 
of status to become a lawful permanent resident.  Instead, she was admitted as a lawful 
permanent resident through the consular process and remained a lawful permanent 
resident when the conditions were removed.  See, e.g., Malik v. Attorney General, 659 
F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Malik did not obtain an adjustment of status to become an 
LPR [lawful permanent resident].  Instead, he derived his LPR status through the process 
described in 8 U.S.C. § 1201.  Because § 1256(a) explicitly discusses ‘adjustment of 
status,’ the statute of limitations does not apply to the institution of removal proceedings 
where Malik did not obtain his LPR status in this manner.”). 
 Petitioner further contends that she was entitled to a continuance and that the IJ’s 
refusal to grant her a continuance violated her due process right to a full and fair hearing.  
This Court does not have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien 
who is removable by reason of having committed a crime involving moral turpitude, 
although we do retain jurisdiction with respect to colorable constitutional and legal 
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claims.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D).  We accordingly lack jurisdiction to 
consider a claim that the agency abused its discretion by denying a continuance.  See, e.g., 
Rachak v. Attorney General, 734 F.3d 214, 216-17 (3d Cir. 2013).  With respect to 
Petitioner’s due process assertions, we conclude that the IJ conducted a full and fair 
hearing in this matter.  We note, for instance, that Petitioner’s counsel notified the IJ at a 
2010 hearing that she would be filing for a waiver of inadmissibility on the grounds that 
“she has two U.S. citizen children.”  (AR57.)  When asked how much time would be 
necessary to present evidence in support of a waiver, the attorney responded, “Not long.”  
(AR59.)  However, no I-130 petition had been submitted as of the February 2013 merits 
hearing—at which time the IJ appropriately refused to postpone this proceeding. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
